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Contested Terrains of Compensation:
Equality, Affirmative Action and Diversity
in the United States
Taunya Lovell Banks·

Introduction
Equality is an elusive concept. Celeste Condit and John Louis Lucaites write
that equality 'is at once a normative abstraction that resonates with the
highest ideals of America's collective being, and a rather narrow and
pedestrian, empirical characterisation of the sameness or identity of any two
objects' (Condit and Lucaites, 1993: ix). In the United States the concept of
equality is unstable and relatively indeterminate. 'The language of equality
is rhetorical cover under which political claims are advanced and contested;
hut it very seldom captures the substance of those political claims' (Waldron,
I 991: 1:35 I). Therefore, some argue, the rhetoric of equality has no substantive content (Westen, 1982). Nevertheless, the rhetoric and public
discourse surrounding discussions of equality influence legal interpretations
of what constitutes compensatory justice.
Given the indeterminacy of law, it is unsurprising that there are
competing visions of equality in the United States today. The controversy
in the U niLed States over what constitutes equality for blacks or African
Americans' and other 'racial minorities'' is one site of this debate. In fact,
much of the current public discourse on affirmative action for example
' is seen by'
centres around the meaning of equality. Affirmative action
proponents as a means to achieving a racially just society. Opponents argue,
however, that alll.rmative action undermines equality between racialised
groups because race can be used as a decision-making factor. This essay
adopts the more cynical view advanced by some critical scholars, namely
that affirmative action programs and anti-discrimination law in general are
not designed to achieve a racially just society.
Anti-discrimination law leaves intact those-institutions and structures
that support racial subordination because the dominant powers are
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unwilling to support an interpretation of legal doctrine that will achieve a
racially just society (Freeman, 1978; Crenshaw, 1989). The dominant powers
construct and interpret anti-discrimination law from the perspective of the
perpetrator of discrimination as opposed to the person discriminated
against. As a result, plaintiffs in discrimination suits find it difficult to
establish actionable discrimination in all but the most flagrant situations
(Freeman, 1978; Lawrence, 1987). Successful legal strategies are short lived
as courts invoke equality on behalf of white plaintiffs who advance racial
discrimination claims, thereby undermining the usefulness of these
strategies for non-white plaintiffs.
This pattern is apparent from a briefreview of Supreme Court race and
gender equal protection cases. Given this reality, the development of any
theory for racial justice in the United States must be a continuous
evolutionary process. Advocates for racial justice must continue to develop
new theories of equality as racial conservatives undermine current legal
theories.

Equal Protection of the Laws
There was no specific guarantee of equality in the US Constitution until the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, almost a century after
the Declaration of Independence. Section 1 of that amendment provides that
'No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws'. This amendment only applies to State action, hut in
1954 the United States Supreme Court read a similar guarantee into the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment which applies to the federal
government (Bolling v Sharpe, 1954).
This constitutional guarantee of equal protection ofthe laws, however,
is problematic. First, the equal protection guarantee applies only to
government (public) not private actors. 1 This public-private distinction
ignores the role private individuals and entities play in thwarting one's
ability to realise equality before the law. Second, even the Supreme Court
admits that equal protection of the laws, like equality, 'is susceptible of
varying interpretations' (Bakke v Regents of the University of California,
1978: 284). Thus, the measure of equality, or determination of sameness or
identity, depends on who is doing the defining as well as the historical
context of the equality claim.
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Since anti-discrimination law views discrimination from the perspective
of a perpetrator rather than that of the victim, equality is defined very
narrowly. In the 19th century, for example, the United States Supreme
Court upheld State laws mandating separation of the races in almost every
walk of life, reasoning that de jure racial segregation did not connote
inequality under the law (Plessy v Ferguson, 1896). The court also upheld
lmv::-, denying equal rights to women, reasoning that '[c]ivillaw, as well as
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
iiphcres and destinies of men and women' (Bradwell v Illinois, 1873: 141,
Brady concurring).

Formal Equality

These decisions do not reflect the perspectives of the petitioners, blacks
and white women, but rather reinforce explicit political decisions about
which groups should be considered full participants in US society. Over time
just what constitutes equal protection under the laws, in the eyes of the
perpetrators, abo changed. The court outlawed government mandated racial
segregation (Brown u Board of Education, 1954) and now applies a
hPightened level of judicial scrutiny to government actions that disadvantage women (Fronterio u Richardson, 1973).

Given the extent of human difference, courts must determine which
differences among individuals or groups justify treating them differently.
The Supreme Court uses the formal equality approach, interpreting the
equal protection guarantee to require that government treat all similarly
situated persons 'equally' (Tussman and TenBroek, 1949). The determination of who is similarly situated usually dictates the outcome of an
inequality claim. Much of the debate about gender equality, for example,
centers on whether women are similarly situated to men. Women often
receive unequal treatment because males are the model against which
notions of equality are measured. Historically, the court drew distinctions
based on alleged differences between women and men that were matters of
'natural destiny' (Bradwell, 1873). In theory, the formal equality approach
adopted by the contemporary Supreme Court rejects any notion of'natural
destiny'. Yet debate still arises over whether biological differencPs between
women and men should be considered in determining what constitutes equal
protection of the laws. If men are the standard used for measuring equality
claims then, under the Constitution, biological differences between women
and men can be used by employers and others to disadvantage women.

Dy the late 20th century court decisions and legislation reflected public
consensus that laws should apply to all 'equally', including racial minorities
and white women. Problems immediately arose over the contemporary
meaning of the equal protection guarantee, and how to achieve this equality
in a country with a long history of racml and gender subordination. The
dt'batl' centered on what constituted 'legal equality' and whether compensatory measures were necessary to this equality for white women and nonwhit<"s or communities of colour.'
For blacks the legacy of slavery and de jure racial segregation made
simpl.v removing legally sanctioned racial barriers, as the court did in
Bn,wn v Board of Education, insufficient to achieve parity with whites.
Following Brown some whites continued to resist efforts to desegregate.
Even where there was no overt resistance, structural barriers growing out
of the systematic exclusion of blacks from various areas of public life
resulted in de f'acto rather than de jure racial exclusion. Similar barriers
existt'd for all women arising from centuries of legalised gender subordination. Compensatory or affirmative measures were needed, but the
dominant powers' narrow construction of the equal protection guarantee
substantially limited the use of the doctrine to secure racial justice.

There are two primary competing visions of legal equality in the United
States. The dominant powers construct equal protection of the laws to mean
equal treatment, or formal equality, and critical scholars a~d anti-r.acialist
argue that equal protection means equal results or suhstantwe equabLy. The
discourse of formal equality is further controlled because the courts
determine who are similarly situated parties for comparison purposes and
require claimants to prove the perpetrator intended to discrimination.

Similarly situated parties

In Geduldig v Aiello (1974) for example, the Supreme Court held that a
State disability insurance plan which covered all short-term disabilities
except pregnancy did not necessarily constitute sex discrimination under the
equal protection clause. Discrimination based on pregnancy did not involve
gender, according to the all-male court, because women were covered for the
same risks as men and vice versa. The court reasoned that since 'only
women become pregnant' and the plan only discriminated against 'some
women' - those who are pregnant - and not all women, there was no
unlawful gender discrimination. In Geduldig u Aiello (1974) women suffered
because they were treated the same as men in a situation where clear
11'>
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biological ditl'erenc(•s between the two dictated a different result to achieve
meaningful equality.
Enm though the equal protection guarantee seems to exempt biological
differences between women and men, courts still must determine whether
some asserted biological gender differences really are social constructs or
'natural destiny' justifications which should not be allowed to defeat gender
discrimination claims. Many of the early equal protection gender cases
decided by the Supreme Court focused on socially constructed differences
framt~d as 'natural' or dictated by biology. In these cases women challenged
n·striction,; on their entry into certain spheres based on alleged 'natural'
difference, unchallenged presumptions about women's abilities to perform
certain tasks (Muller l' Ore!{on, 190R; Goesaert u Clearly, 1948; Hoyt u
Florida, 1961 ).

Today, the court considers most restrictions that disadvantage women
based on their alleged 'natural' differences to be pretexts for unlawful
gendPr discrimination. Even so, there are situations where the court's
construction of who is similarly situated preserves what appear to be
socially constructed practice:=; that perpetuate gender discrimination. For
example, in Michael M u Superior Court (19tH) the court upheld a State
statutory rape law which punished men, but not women, who engaged in sex
with mmurs, reasoning that the statute protected an important State
interest, prevention of "illegitimate pregnancies'. Three dissenting judges
belit'ved that the law was based on 'sexual stereotypes'. If prevention of
pregnancies outside marriage was the real concern, then adult women who
have Sf'xual intercourse with minor males also should be punished. A better
explanation is that the outcome in Michael M simply represents . a
paternalistic perpetrator-focused effort to suppress adolescent women's
sexuality while implicitedly condoning the sexual activity of adolescent men.
The :=;anw year in Rostkcr u Goldberg (1981) the court upheld a federal law
exempting women from registt,ring for the military draft reasoning that
women and men were not similarly situated because only men were eligible
for combat roles, an essential reason for the draft requirement- As the three
dissenters pointed out, however, the government never established that
there was either a need to draft only combat troops or draft men for both
combat and non-combat positions while exempting women. Arguably, the
statute simply perpetuated a governmental perpetrator-based preference for
an all-male military, since neither the majority nor the dissenters
questioned the decision to have male only combat troops.

IJ.J

The petitioners in both Michael M and Rostker were men who
unsuccessfully challenged gender specific statutes they claimed
disadvantaged men. As these cases suggest, formal equality also dictates
equal treatment in reverse discrimination suits, where laws allegedly
disadvantage men. The fact that law traditionally operated to disadvantage
women and not men often gets lost in the court's analysis, but this result is
not unexpected when the legal doctrine adopts a perpetrator as opposed to
a victim perspective.
The equal treatment approach dictated by formal equality disco~rages
affirmative gender-conscious efforts to counter the effects of women's long
history of subordination by men. Women's colleges developed in the United
States because historically women were denied access to higher educatwn.
Yet in Mississippi College for Women u Hogan (1982: 729) the court ordered
a State-funded all women's nursing school to admit male applicants. ,Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, said that 'rather than
compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of
excluding males from admission to the school of nursing tends to perpetuate
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job'.
Some feminist and critical scholars questioned the court's assumption
that a man excluded from an all-women's institution created to compensate
for the exclusion of women from higher educational institutions was
similarly situated. Unlike women in earlier years, the male claimant in
Hogan was not totally excluded from publicly funded nursing traini~g. Ye~
the court treated Hogan's exclusion from the nursing program at MissiSSippi
College for Women as discrimination, even though nursing training was
available at other State-supported universities. The Hogan 'reverse
discrimination' decision shows how anti-discrimination laws can be co-opted
by the very perpetrators of the discrimination.
The decision in Hogan left unclear whether publicly funded sex
segregated colleges or universities are ever permissible under_ the equal
protection clause. The court's most recent decision in this area still does not
clearly answer this question. In United States u Virginia (1996) the c~u:t
ordered the State to admit women to the all-male publicly funded VIrgima
Military Institute (VMI). The State argued unsuccessfully that all-male
military education especially benefited men and furthered educatwn~l
diversity in the State. The Supreme Court rejected Virginia's claim, but dtd
not squarely address whether publicly funded single sex coll~ges and
universities are ever permissible under the equal protection clause.· Instead,
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the. court concluded that the State had not established its claim that men
denved
some special educational benefit from VMI's t rammg
· · program to
.
.
JUStJ(y a male-only policy, and had not provide women with substantially
equal educatwnal opportunities.

~orne may see United States v Virginia as the flip side of Hogan, but in
reahty both threaten, not reinforce the quest for social justice. Both
dec1s10ns preserve an overall institutional structure that favours men
t~en~hy t.r~ating women like men. Meaningful social justice for women rna;
d1ctate chfterent paths for women and men.
Intent

tu

discrinunate

A Sh·ond problen~ that arises under the legal regime of 'formal equality' is
t ~e T~ef:d for cl3Imants to establish an intent to discriminate in race
<hscnmmatwn claims. Often this requirement poses an insurmountable
b~rner. when the challenged provision is neutral on its face. but has a
dJscnmlllatory impact. In Washington u Davis (1976) the plaintiffs
estabhshed that a written objective test used in the selection of police
officers had a du;proportionate impact on black applicants. They argued that
the test, although neutral on its face and applied evenhandedly discrim·d
.'
I
nate. on the basis of race because its use imposed greater burdens on black
apphcants than white applicants. The Supreme Court found that proof of
the racwlly. d1s~roportionate effect of the test did not signal an equal
protectiOn vwlatwn because the litigants could not prove that the test was
adopted with the specific intent or purpose to exclude blacks from the police
force. Thus. the continued use by the local government of a test where
whites disproportionately out-performed blacks was insufficient under
current equal protection jurisprudence to raise even a presumption of
un~awful race discrimination in the absence of any overtly intentional racial
an1mus.
. Charles Lawrence argues that the result in Washington v Davis is
unJust because the court ignores unconsciously motivated racial discrimination. ~his 'unconscious racism', he says, stems from a shared history and
cult~re mfluenced by racism which often induces negative feelings and
opmwns about non-whites. These feelings and opinions often influence the
behaviour of whites resulting in unintentional racial discrimination
(Lawrence, 19R7 ). Since there is no overt racial animus or invidious intent
to discriminate, the formal equality approach to equal protection denies the
existence of a legally cognisable race discrimination claim.

Lawrence writes that '[t]he intent requirement also disregards how
overtly racist practices and laws of the past have become entrenched in
institutions of white privilege that do not require new racist intent for their
maintenance' (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: 78). For example, in Dauis the
court never questions whether education in substandard schools might be
one reason why so many black applicants scored lower than their white
counterparts. Thus, black applicants who already had been denied an equal
chance to learn were further penalised by the use of a test that in effect
perpetuated an educational advantage gained by whites as a result of recent
racism (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: 78).
The intent requirement in equal protection jurisprudence allows courts
to ignore connections between the country's history of slavery and de jure
segregation and the current unequal position of blacks and other nonwhites. The requirement of an intent to discriminate permits the unconscious racism embodied in the policies and practices of employers and
educational institutions to go unexamined and unchallenged in the courts.
So racial conservatives can attribute the continuing economic and educational disparity between blacks, most non-whites and whites to internal
problems within these communities. 6 As a result, many conservatives assert
that racial discrimination no longer exists today, and now the laws should
be 'colourblind'.
Increasingly, some members of the court agree. Justice Scalia wrote in
Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena (1995: 2118, Scalia concurring), that
'under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a
debtor race ... To pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred'. Charles Lawrence and Mari Matsuda (1997: RO)
call the arguments in support of colourblindness the 'big lie'. They and other
critical race scholars argue that affirmative action or compensatory
measures are the minimum needed for blacks and other non-whites to have
meaningful equal opportunity. Whether these compensatory measures are
short term as opposed to long term depends also upon one's vision of
equality. The answer also goes to the heart of the debate over affirmative
action.
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Mfirmative Action
~rmative action usually consists of'public or private actions or programs
whi_ch provide or seek to provide opportunities or benefits to persons on the
basis of, among other things, their membership in a specific group or groups'
(Jones, 19R5: 903). The traditional rationale for most forms of affirmative
action is redress for past racial or gender injustice. Early affirmative efforts
simply meant establishing positive policies of non-discrimination on the
basis of race. In addition to prohibiting the exclusion of blacks from jobs,
early affirmative action programs included recruitment efforts designed to
attract blacks into certain jobs. The rationale for these affirmative efforts
~as not some moral imperative, but rather that a racially integrated workforce was m the nation's economic interest (Jones, 1988: 903). When these
early affirmative action measures proved ineffective, President Johnson
issued an executive order in 1964 that compelled certain government
c~n.tractors to make race a factor in employment decisions by establishing
h1rmg goals for minorities.'

racial integration does not, however, necessarily result in a racially just
society.

Voluntarv affirmative action efforts are the most controversial and most
susceptible to fail under traditional equal protection analysis. Voluntary
compensatory measures include racial preferences, preferring members of
a racially subordinated group over white applicants or preferring women
over men when making hiring or admissions decisions. This racial or gender
preference, however, does not operate as a total bar for white or male
applicants. The preferences simply improve, slightly, the chances for women
and non-white applicants, rather than fully compensate for existing
structural inequalities. Preferences are token measures because they
require the 'outsider' white woman or non-white applicant to adapt to
existing structures rather than require the dismantling of these
exclusionary structures.
The Supreme Court and challenges to affirmative action

In the mid-1960s Congress also enacted anti-discrimination laws to
combat employment discrimination. Mter finding that periodic compliance
revww and employment reports were ineffective means to integrate the
work forces of government contractors, the Nixon administration developed
the Philadelphia Plan relying on hiring goals and timetables (Jones, 1988).
Use of these measures spread from government contractors to public and
private employers and institutions of higher learning.
Of course, these affirmative actions measures were not welcomed by all.
In addition to some whites who were resistant to racial integration, some
activists within the black community regarded these affirmative efforts as
~osmetic and inadequate because they lacked mechanisms for community
~n-put or control of decision making. 'The affirmative action programs put
m place met the needs of the institutions that created them' (Lawrence and
Matsuda, 1997: 25).
Proponents of affirmative action argued that compensatory race and
gender conscious policies are needed to redress past government-sanctioned
discrimination and provide greater access to opportunities routinely denied
non-whites and white women in the past as a result of societal
discrimination. In addition, some argue that race conscious measures are
necessary to achieve a diverse workforce and enrich the educational
environment, a point addressed more fully in the next section. Promotion of

lUi

A divided Supreme Court has reviewed challenges to affirmative action
efforts. In Bakke ( 1978) one of the earliest challenges to reach the court, a
plurality agreed that the UC-Davis Medical School admissions program
reserving seats for minority applicants was unconstitutional, but they could
not agree on the level of scrutiny required when reviewing (benign) raceconscious affirmative action policies. Justice Powell, for example, said that
race could be used as a factor when making admissions decisions to ensure
'diversity' among entering university students. Two years later in Fullilrnw
v Klutznick (1980) the court upheld a federal program requiring that 10 per
cent of all federal funds awarded to contractors for State and local building
projects be spend on goods and services provided by minority business
enterprises, saying that the program survived both intermediate and strict
scrutiny reviews (472-8). Four years later in Wygant v Jackson Board of
Education (1986) another plurality struck down a local school board policy
that attempted to preserve the jobs of minority teachers when making layoff
decisions.
By 1989 the Supreme Court, turning a blind eye to the legacy of racial
discrimination against blacks, issued several rulings that subjected
government-sanctioned remedial or benign race-conscious measures to as
stringent a review as invidious discrimination claims. A plurality in City of
Richmond v Croson (1989) resolved the uncertainty about the standard of
review for benign race conscious measures raised in Bakke, applying strict
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scrutmy in striking down a city-initiated affirmative action set-aside
program designed to remedy past discrimination. The next year the court
in Metro Broadcasting u Federal Communications Commission (1990)
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to a federally-sponsored race and
gender conscious program. This distinction between benign federal and
State programs was short lived. Five years after Metro Broadcasting the
court in Adarand Constructors v Pena (1990) reversed itself holding that
'[fled era! racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that
interest' (2117).

when in fact white women have been the primary beneficiaries of
affirmative action efforts.' Yet, white women have not been vocal in the
current debates over the future of affirmative action in the United States.

With the exception of Bakke, all of these Supreme Court cases focused
on affirmative action efforts in employment. To date the court has resisted
efforts by racial conservatives to examine benign race conscious measures
by colleges and universities. In 1996, for example, the court declined to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood u Texas, applying a strict
scrul iny standard of review to strike down a benign race-conscious
admissions program instituted by the University of Texas Law School. A
year earlier the court also declined to review an analogous Fourth Circuit
deci6ion, Podberesky u Kirwan (1995) striking down a race-based scholarship
program designed to remedy past and continuing discrimination at the
University of Maryland. The court's refusal to hear either Hopwood or
Pudbercsky leaves unresolved whether the Croson strict scrutiny standard
applies to higher education cases and whether the diversity rationale
advanced by Justice Powell in Bakke remains good law.

discrimination.

Some see these recent affirmative action decisions as signalling the
death of affirmative action in the United States. Others argue that
affirmative action needs to be restructured, substituting preferences based
on class for racial preference (Kahlenberg, 1996: 728). Still others argue for
expansion of race and gender preferences for diversity purposes, a point
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Public rf'action to affirmatil•e action
Over the years, public support for voluntary affirmative action, while never
strong, has eroded. Critics argue that race conscious efforts increase rather
than minimise racial antagonism. Affirmative action, these critics claim,
undermines the nation's Puritan work ethos which supports individual
achievement or merit over birthright (Morrison, 1994: 354-5). Interestingly,
criticism focuses on race-based rather than gender-based affirmative action

120

The reasons for the relative silence of white women are not entirely
clear. Some women may believe that they no longer need affirmative action,
and others may resist tying gender-based affirmative action to race-based
affirmative action, believing that the public is more supportive of the former
than the latter. A more cynical view is that many white women see nonwhite women and men as competitors, and retain or adopt notions of white
superiority thereby rejecting calls for an anti-racist approach to
White women still run the risk of being measured by male standards
applied from the perspective of powerful men. They still experience
discrimination. Sexual harassment remains a problem in the workplace.
Women also continue to be under represented in the higher echelons of the
private and public workforce. They also continue to make less money than
men with comparable credentials (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: lf>3-5).
Opponents of affirmative action characterise these efforts as mandating
racial preferences which they argue are inherently unjust to whites and
inconsistent with notions of equal protection. Affirmative action opponents
either deny responsibility for past or continuing discrimination or assume,
disingenuously, that racism has ended. Thus, they argue, whites, especially
white men are 'victimised' by compensatory measures aimed at racially
subordinated groups. This narrow vision of equality focuses on individual
experiences, which may vary with a variety of factors such as a person's
race, class, age, gender, and location. According to Alan Freeman (1978:
1053), this approach to discrimination is the consequence of 'antidiscrimination law [that] is hopelessly embedded in the perpetrator
perspective ... [and is] ultimately indifferent to the conduction of the victim'.

An individualistic approach to equality makes it difficult to attack
structural or systemic discrimination, resulting in piecemeal litigation
which relies primarily on each individual victim of discrimination. This
focus on individualism ignores reality. Discriminatory measures are based
on group membership, not individual traits, and the protection of blacks as
a group is consistent with the purpose behind the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee (Fried, l990: 10910). In addition, giving racially subordinated groups preference in
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employment. government contracts and university admissicns
mconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality.

EQUALITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN THE USA

IS

not

Diversity
Legal origins of diversity

Racial preferences and the Constitution
The_ equal protection clause does not clearly outlaw benign racial
prefere~ces. Alexander Bickel (1955) argues that the purpose of the equal
protectwn clause was to guarantee blacks equality with whites for those
rights deemed necessary incidents of their status as free persons. During
the 19th century:
Racial dil10rpnces were pern,ived as fundamental, enduring and, almost
always, rd1c>ctmg the mnatc> superiority of the whit£' population .... The idea
that hlack andwhite arc equal, that race> is not a meaningful category, did
not ~t'~'ln to gam ascendancy until well into the present century' (Sandalow,
1970: 1164).

Involuntary characteristics like skin color or sex have 'frequently been used
to perpetuate the dominant political, economic, or social position of certain
hrroups' hut these concerns should not arise where the dominant group
grants preferences to white women or racial minorities (Sandalow, 1975: 664
n :15, n68). Yet, as prPviously noted, opponents of racial preferences argue
that pn~ferPncps art> non-egalitarian.
There is a difference, for example, between laws granting racial
preferences in admission to higher education and earlier laws prohibiting
the admission of blacks to colleges and universities. Even a conservative
federal judge like Hichard Posner would agree that these situations are
different. Judge Posner would argue, however, that courts should ignore
these differences (Sandalow, 1975: 676-9). He and other racial conservatives
claim that legal equality can be achieve only if law is truly colourblind. A
rigid colourhlind rule, however, produces undesirable outcomes or consequl'nces in a society like the United States which admits its history of past
discrimination and continuing 'societal' discrimination. Under these
circumstances, ignoring continuing racial inequalities implicitly condones
racial discrimination. Given this history, the diversity rationale for racial
preferences seem>. a necessary step to achieve racial justice.

The notion of diversity as a justification for racial preferences in the context
of higher education first appeared in DeFunis v Odegaard (1974) the earliest
reverse discrimination suit involving professional higher education to reach
the United States Supreme Court A limited version of the diversity model
was suggested by Justice William Douglas. In DeFunis the court refused to
address directly whether racial preferences are ever permissible, ruling
instead that the matter was moot since the petitioner, Marco DeFunis, Jr,
would complete his legal education even if he lost. Dissenting, Justice
Douglas wrote:
The introduction of race as a measure of an applicant's qualification normally
introduces a capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious
discrimination. Once race is a starting point educators and courts are
immediately embroiled in competing claims of different racial and ethnic
groups that would make difficult, manageable standards consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause. 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official State sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States.' The Law School's admissions policy cannot be
reconciled with that purpose, unless cultural standards of a diverse rather
than a homogeneous socie~y are taken into account . ... The key to the problem
is the consideration of each applicant in a racially neutral way. (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) (333-4).

By 1974 it seemed apparent, at least to Justice Douglas, that the direction
of Supreme Court jurisprudence weighed against the use of racial
preferences for remedial purposes, unless, as Justice Douglas suggests,
cultural standards of a diverse rather than a homogeneous society are taken
into account.
Justice William Powell picked up on Justice Douglas' language in Bakke
v Regents of the University of California ( 1978). Like DeFunis, the plaintiff
in Bakke, a white male, claimed that minority applicants to medical school
with bench mark scores lower than his were admitted both years he was
rejected. These bench mark scores relied more heavily on quantitative
measures like standardised test scores and grade point averages than
subjective measures like interview evaluations and letters of recommendation. The University of California at Davis (hereinafter UC-Davis),
the defendant in Bakke, never addressed the reliability of these measures,
particularly as applied to minority applicants (Lawrence, 1976). Instead, the
school created a special admissions program to increase the number of
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'disadvantaged' students in each entering class." The University's short-term
goal was to increase diversity among its student body. Its long-term goal
was to stimulate interest in health professions among students from
disadvantaged communities.
Justice Blackmun in a separate opinion in Bakke argued for a society in
which race is irrelevant, but acknowledged that to reach this point race
must be taken into account. He saw racial preferences as temporary and
racial irrelevancy as the ultimate goal. This and other language in Bakke led
to discussions about compensatory measures which often conflate traditional affirmative action, compensation for past or continuing intentional
discrimination, with the concept of diversity, the vision ofhow a pluralistic
society ought to look. Arguably, the rationale for each is different.

Positive diversity
Recently critical race theorists and other scholars have set out another
theoretical basis for racial preferences, namely that the presence of racial
and ethnic diversity within the academy and workplace is a necessary
component to a just society. In fact, a racially and ethnically diverse
environment reflects the larger society and promotes a more representative
and enriched sense of community. Advocates of positive diversity reject a
formal approach to equal protection of the laws in favour of a conception of
substantive equality, which focuses not on equal or same treatment but on
equal power between inevitably diverse groups. The proposition is that true
equal protection under the laws consists of equivalent relationships between
two or more clearly separate entities, each of which possesses its own
identity.
Only in the higher education cases has the court taken an approach
anything like the idea of substantive equality. Justice Powell in Bakke (at
2749) acknowledged that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the equal protection clause to 'function as bridging the vast
distance between members of the Negro [sic] race and the white majority'
but relied instead on the 'universal terms' of the amendment. He rejected
the Regents' claim that discrimination against the white majority is suspect
even if its purpose is benign. While racial preferences could not be used by
a State university to remedy societal discrimination- the legacy of racial
apartheid- Justice Powell reasoned that race could be used as one of many
factors when making admissions decisions. The permissible goal, he said,
was the university's interest in a diverse student body. Today, as mentioned

124

EQUALITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN THE USA

earlier, even this rationale is under attack in federal courts as evidenced by
the Podberesky and Hopwood decisions.
The diversity concept has been attacked in the States as well. In March
1995, shortly after the Adarand decision, University of Californi~ system
president, JW Peltason justified the need for positive diversity saymg that:
[A]s the public university of our nation's n:tost_ racially and ethnically ?ive~se
mainland State, the University has an obligation to encomp~ss that d~vers~ty
in its student body, its faculty, and its staff. What happens m our U~1Vers1ty
campuses will have much to do with our ability to forge an e~ergmg new
culture, a culture that is inclusive, varied, and respectful of difference, but
which also unites us into a community that can live, work, pros~er, ~n.d
flourish in our Constitutional democracy. It may well threaten Cahforma s
social and economic future if we make it harder for mn:wnt:y and
disadvantaged people to learn or work in the University of Cahfo~ma and
other institutions of higher education in this State (quoted m Morns, 1996:
187).

Unpersuaded, the University of California Board of Re~ents v~t~d, ~o
prohibit the use of'race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or natwna_l on~n m
admissions, employment or contracting decisions at the Umvers1ty of
California's nine public campuses (Morris, 1996: 186). The consequences of
the Board's actions were swift, especially in the system's most competitive
professional schools. The number of black applicants admitted to U?Berkeley's law school, dropped almost 90 per cent from 75 in 1996 to 14m
the 1997, the first year racial preferences were not used (Rabkin,_1997: 63).
In 1997 UCLA law school admitted 80 per cent fewer black apphcants and
35 per cent fewer Latino applicants (Savage, 1997: A1).
The State's public medical schools also reported a decline in both
applications and admissions that started in 1996, the year after the ~ege~t's
decision but before its implementation. In 1994 when the natwnw1de
number of students from racial and ethnic minorities in medical schools
peaked, four of the five University of California schools ranked among the
top eight schools producing minority doctors. By 1997 two of the five
California public medical schools had no Black entering students. The UC
medical schools saw a 22 per cent drop in minority applicants compared to
a 14 per cent decline nationwide. Some University officials speculate that
fewer racial and ethnic minorities are applying to the UC schools because
they perceive the Regent's policy as signalling a less supportive environment
for minorities within these schools (Burdman, 1997).
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Interestingly, some opponents of affirmative action seem unconcerned
about the potential return to the virtual exclusion of some racial and ethnic
minorities from higher education, especially at the most elitist schools. They
believe 'the change reflects a return of fairness to the university' (emphasis
added) (Burdman, 1997). Yet, these same individuals would be less
accepting of a co-educational university where the 'neutral' admissions or
hiring policies resulted in an overwhelmingly male university. The reason
for this tolerance of racial but not gender segregation in a racially and
ethnically diverse country goes unexamined in the public debates over
affirmative action.
Opponents of affirmative action also argue that true social justice occurs
only where race and ethnicity are irrelevant. As US Supreme Court Justice
Antoin Scalia wrote in a separate opinion in Adarand, '[i]n the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American' (at 2118). These
proponents of colourblindness argue that:
fW]hen we hand out society's goodies based on merit and achievement, we
should examine just those yard sticks which measure merit and achievement.
... it doesn't really matter that much how many of any racial or ethnic group
is in an entering class, just that your pick the ... most qualified students'
(Suarez, 1997: 7).

The diversity concept that had been used by colleges and universities in
justifying race-conscious efforts in admissions and faculty hiring grows out
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bakke. But now the validity of this modest
goal has been questioned by a federal appellate court in Hopwood v Texas
(1996). That court reasoned that racial diversity in higher education is not
a compelling governmental interest and is inconsistent with the concept of
colourblind or 'merit-based' admissions criteria. Merit, however, like
equality, is always relative and contextual.

Colourblindness or Merit Model
The reference today to colourblind laws comes from Justice John Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Plessy and those now famous words, '[t]here is no caste
here. Our Constitution is colourblind' (at 559). These words standing alone
indicate the innate equality of all races, but Justice Harlan knew that the
Jim Crow practices of whites were based on a belief in black inferiority. In
essence, he agreed with the majority in Plessy that blacks were not, and
probably never would be, the social equals of whites. But he also saw more
harm than good in legitimising State laws mandating racial segregation.
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Harlan believed that blacks should be treated the same under law - they
should enjoy formal equality.
Justice Harlan's notion of colourblindness or merit is used by both white
racial conservatives and working class whites, but for different reasons.
Most racial conservatives fully understand the context in which Justice
Harlan used the term colourblindness in Plessy and the inappropriateness
of the term today. The formal equality Justice Harlan intended is far
different from the substantive equality denied blacks and Latinos/a~ ~y
cases like Hopwood and Podberesky. Today this colourblind rhe~onc _Is
invoked to resist efforts to dismantle a system of privilege based pnmanly
on race, not to guarantee blacks equal treatment.
The plaintiffs in DeFunis, Bakke, and Hopwood, all work~ng_ class
whites, argued that 'merit' and not race should govern admissiOn to
professional education. They, along with racial conservat~ves, conten~ ~hat
colourblind, and thus 'neutral' criteria, epitomise ment-based deciSI~n
making by institutions of higher learning. The _validity of no~-:acial
admission criteria like alumni preferences to applicants from pnvile~ed
backgrounds, standardised test scores and undergra_duat~ grade pomt
averages are not examined for racial bias. Also unexammed IS whether the
so-called 'merit-based' criterion identifies the students who can best serve
the nation.
An increasingly conservative federal court unquestioningly a~cepts
claims of white plaintiffs that selection criteria other than race ~re ~ah~ and
non-discriminatory. In addition, colleges and universities, the_ mstlt~tw~al
defendants in these reverse discrimination cases, are not reqmred to JUStify
their heavy reliance on quantitative measures like the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) or Medical College Admissions Test (MCA~).and
undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) in making admissions d~ciSIO~s.
The consideration of race by these institutions, in an attempt to diversify
111
faculties and student bodies, is recent, and the extent of institutional
commitment to diversifying their communities is often questionable. The~e
previously overwhelmingly white institutions have a vested inter~st m
preserving 'neutral' admission criteria which disadvantages non-whites.
In the key cases challenging affirmative action efforts in higher
education, the real parties of interest, blacks and other students of colour,
had no voice in structuring the universities' defence. Therefore, the
underlying assumption of the conservatives' attack, that removing race
makes the current admissions criteria neutral and thus fair, was never
1?.7
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challenged. Instead, the courts in DeFunis, Bakke, and Hopwood were
swayed by plaintiffs' arguments that quantitative measures like
standardised tests and UGPA are neutral and thus fair determinants of
admissibility. The institutional defendants were never required to explain
or justify all their admissions criteria, nor admission goals.
Justice William 0 Douglas, dissenting in DeFunis, questioned the
validity of the LSAT and undergraduate grade point averages (GPA) as
predicters of success in law school, noting that neither Marco DeFunis Jr
nor the University of Washington challenged the validity of these admission
criteria. DeFunis simply claimed that his quantitative scores were as good
as or better than minority applicants admitted by the law school. The
University of Washington defended their admissions process based on the
assumption that the LSAT score and UGPA (bench mark scores) were valid
predictors of success in law school.
Allan Bakke made a similar claim, namely that minority applicants with
benchmark scores lower than his were admitted both years he was rejected.
These bench mark scores relied more heavily on quantitative measures like
standardised test scores and grade point averages than subjective measures
like interview evaluations and letters of recommendation. The University
of California at Davis (hereinafter UC-Davis), the defendant in Bakke, never
addressed the reliability of these measures, particularly as they applied to
minority applicants (Lawrence, 1976).
Allan Bakke's claim that he was 'better qualified' because he had a
higher numeral index than some minority applicants who were admitted
went unchallenged. Charles Lawrence (1976: 4) points out that in Bakke the
minority community lacked the legal resources to mount a defence and
naively believed that UC-Davis would vigorously defend its admissions
program. According to Professor Lawrence, potential minority interveners
'would have demonstrated that the Medical School has not one but many
"standards" by which it measures candidates whom it has already adjudged
minimally qualified'. This approach, however, would call into question the
heavy reliance on quantitative measures like standardised tests and grades.
If quantitative measures cannot be used as the sole or primary measure of
admissibility, then colleges and universities might look to other more
individualised, and subjective measures to determine who, among many
qualified applicants, should be given one of the limited number of seats.
Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson's extensive and widely praised study
of black undergraduate students points out the ways in which racism affects

blacks measured performance on academic tests (Steele and Aronson, 1995).
They argue that persistent and widely held negative soci~tal stereoty~es
about blacks' intellectual ability and competence have a social~p~ycholog1cal
impact on black's performance on standardised tests. While It IS true t~at
blacks often have lower standardised test scores than other entenng
students, some studies suggest these tests are flawed when use~ as the
primary predictors of performance (Steele and Aronson 1995; Wightm_an
1996). Further, Steele and Aronson argue that many black students with
high quantitative predictors underperform as o~ten as blac~ st~dents
admitted with weaker credentials because of the social-psychological Impact
of the racial stereotypes attached to these students. Black students know
that the stereotypes about them raise questions about their intellectual
ability and they may grow weary of fending off what Steele and Aronson
call 's~reotype vulnerability'. Even when they do not believe the ste:eotype,
'stereotype vulnerability' can cost black students many pomts on
standardised exams.
Steele and others challenge critics who claim that affirmative action in
higher education displaces qualified white applicants. Steele fo~~d that at
the undergraduate level this occurs only in elite colleges compnsi~g 15 per
cent of all four-year colleges in the United States. There was no evidence of
preference in admissions among the rest. Steele concludes that '[o]verall,
affirmative action causes little displacement of other students -less by far
than other forms of preferences, like the one for children of alumni' (Ste~le,
1995: A25). As stated previously, in reality compensatory efforts hke
affirmative action displace few whites, whereas the absence of such
programs in colleges and universities works against blacks and other nonwhite students.
In DeFunis and Bakke the minority community failed to act swiftly and
intervene in those reverse discrimination lawsuits. In contrast, the
Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-law Associat~on s~ught
unsuccessfully to intervene in Hopwood alleging that the Umversity_ of
11
Texas could not adequately protect their interests. The trial court demed
their request, saying that the objective of both the law school and the
interveners was the same, viz preservation of the status quo.
On appeal both organisations attempted to intervene again, ar~ing
that the law school failed to assert one of their proposed defences, VIZ t~e
legality of the Texas Index 12 under Title VI. The appellate court demed their
request, discounting the fact that both organisations were prevented from
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introducing evidence to support their claim that the Texas Index 'by itself
was an unlawful basis for admissions decisions'. 13 Instead, the court repeated the conclusion of the earlier appellate opinion that 'the interests of
the associations were adequately represented by the law school and the
State, and ... as a practical matter, disposition in the principal suit would
not impair or impede either of those groups' interests' (Hopwood, 1996: 961).
Evidentially, the real possibility of a dramatic decrease in the number of
black and Latino/a students admitted to subsequent law classes was not
considered an impairment of the groups' interests. So even where the
minority community acts in a timely fashion to intervene, the courts assist
the plaintiffs in framing the issues in ways that deny the affected parties,
the beneficiaries of the schools' programs, from having a voice in shaping the
issues presented by the lawsuit. In many respects courts today ignore racial
inequalities much as did the Supreme Court in Plessy one hundred years
ago.

Calls for Reform
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to deviate from an approach offormal
equality to race-based discrimination, few options remain for those who seek
to preserve racial diversity in higher education. Increasingly, both supporters and critics contend that affirmative action is dead. Some
pragmatists call for non-racial measures like college lotteries as a means of
protecting educational opportunities for non-whites (Guinier, 1997). On the
other hand, some optimists argue for expanding affirmative action using a
substantive equality approach that focuses on equal outcomes or results
(Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997). As the entering classes at Texas and
California colleges and universities become whiter, the future of affirmative
action is unclear. A few liberals have sounded the alarm, but much of the
public seems unconcerned (Lewis, 1997).
Access to higher education was a mechanism used by civil rights lawyers
like Thurgood Marshall to dismantle de jure racial discrimination (Missouri
ex rei Gaines, 1938; McLaurin v Oklahoma, 1950; and Sweatt v Painter,
1950). Even after, the Brown (1954) decision many southern colleges
actively resisted admitting black students and other colleges across the
nation passively continued as white-only institutions. Today, more than 40
years after Brown, the States of Mississippi and Louisiana remain under ·
court order to complete dismantling segregated public colleges and
universities.
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Brown v Board of Education built on a series of legal cases attacking the
total exclusion of blacks from colleges and universities across the nation.
Ironically, today conservatives use Brown to advance a colourblind
argument that will deny many blacks meaningful access to higher
education. While some southern States persist in resisting efforts to
desegregate their institutions of higher learning, white plaintiffs attack
affirmative programs designed to increase minority enrolment at other
institutions.
Rather than appreciate this irony, today US courts tend to narrow the
situations where the equal protection clause would allow race-conscious
compensatory measures. The consequences, most commentators concede, is
that colleges and universities will become less racially diverse, and the
educational gap between whites and blacks in particular will increase, a
situation tolerated under the current interpretation of the equal protection
clause. There is ample evidence that the law does not dictate this result. The
acceptance by courts, legislative bodies and the general public of white
feminists' arguments about the different perspective the presence of women
bring to educational institutions and the workplace, illustrates that the
diversity rationale can work in the United States. The rejection of the
diversity rationale when applied to racial and ethnic minorities suggests a
continuing resistance to compensatory justice for non-white racially
subordinated groups.

Conclusion
The traditional concept of affirmative action as compensation for past or
continuing racial discrimination has been rejected by a substantial portion
of the general public. In fact, racial conservatives have used the same arguments advanced by racially subordinated groups to undermine these efforts
to secure racial justice. Justifying racial preferences as a compensatory
measure to counter past or continuing discrimination belies the depth of
racial discrimination in the United States. Compensatory racial preferences
suggest short-term or temporary remedies. This understanding of
affirmative action has been used by racial conservatives to undermine the
legal viability of this concept. Therefore, positive diversity, \\'hich is an
affirmative celebration of difference as an important component of society,
seems a better approach to achieving compensatory justice for racial and
ethnic minorities. Thus diversity as a rationale for racial preferences needs
to be separated from affirmative action. It is possible that the diversity
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rationale will be accepted under the current legal regime, but limited to the
educational context because education has 'such a dramatic effect on one's
life' (Cosner. 1996: 1024). Granted that education provides access to the
tools for economic sufficiency, this still does not necessarily translate into
employment. Therefore, in its present form the diversity rationale will be
another short-term approach to the problem of racial injustice in the United
States.
Given the United States' long history of racial discrimination, especially
against blacks, it would be a tragic mistake to require racial and ethnic
diversity in educational institutions but not the workplace or economic
sphere. Under this approach it is possible for a racially diverse student body
to be taught by an overwhelmingly white professorate. Meaningful
compensatory justice in the United States requires that both the educational
and employment environments reflect values and perspectives of all groups
that comprise the nation. Thus, alternative legal theories need to be
developed to expand the dominant ideology.
Social justice theories developed under the current legal regime will be
temporary measures easily capable of being undermined in the way reverse
discrimination suits undermined efforts to obtain social justice for white
women and racially subordinated groups in the United States. Thus, social
justice theory must be constantly evolving to avoid co-optation by racial
conservatives. Ultimately, whether the United States has achieved racial
justice will be measured by the presence or absence of economic and social
conditions like residential, educational, and employment segregation, race
and gender discrimination, and poverty.

Notes
*

1.
2.

3.
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Taunya Lovell Banks is the ,Jacob A France Professor of Equality
Jurisprudence, University of Maryland School of Law. The author wishes to
thank April Cropper for clerical assistance and the University of Maryland for
research support.
I will use the terms Black and African American interchangeably throughout
this essay to denote persons of African ancestry.
I put the term 'racial minorities' in quotations to remind the reader that race
is a social rather than scientific classification.
The Supreme Court in several cases, primarily between the 1940s and mid1960s used the State action doctrine to reach some forms of private
discrimination that had a public character. See, for example, Marsh v Alabama
(1946) (company owned town); Shelly v Kraemer (1948) (racially restrictive
covenants); and Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) (restaurant in
city-owned parking facility). In addition, Congress used its power to regulate
interstate commerce to reach some forms of non-governmental discrimination.
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4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States (1964); Katzenbach v
McClung (1964) (upholding the public accommodation section of the Civil
Rights Act 1964 (US)).
The terms communities of colour and people of colour are used by critical race
scholars in the United States to denote non-white subordinated racial and
ethnic groups like blacks, Asians, Latinos/as as well as indigenous peoples like
American Indians and Hawaiians.
'Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide
"separate but equal" undergraduate institutions for males and females': United
States v Virginia (1996: 533 n 7).
Turning a blind eye to this reality, some jurists and scholars attribute the
continued disparity between black and white in the United States to a 'culture
of poverty' (Dinesh D'Souza, 1995). It is not racism they argue, but a
dysfunctional minority culture that creates the disparities.
Executive Order No 11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965).
Professor Lawrence and Matsuda cite several convincing examples. San
Francisco Fire Department which in 1978 had no women now has 70. Today
women receive 36.8 per cent of all PhDs awarded in the United States compare
to 14.4 per cent in 1971. Fifty per cent of the Fortune 500 companies now have
at least one woman board member (Lawrence and Matsuda: 152-3).
Non-whites were not automatically considered 'disadvantaged' but had to come
from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds.
For example, Texas openly denied admission to any black applicant until 1950:
Sweatt v Painter (1950) (held that a separate State law school for blacks was
not 'equal' to the law school at the University of Texas).
Hopwood: 959. Initially, both organisations attempted to intervene before trial,
but were denied by the District Court and that decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals: Hopwood v Texas (1994) (per curia).
Texas Index (TI) is a composite of the LSAT and GPA. The University of Texas
relies heavily on the TI, a quantitative measure, in determining who to admit.
An applicant's index is used for ranking purposes (Hopwood at 935).
The appellate court said that an earlier appellate court panel had considered
and rejected the potential 'divergence of interests'. According to the court, the
trial judge allowed the interveners to remain involved in the case throughout,
acting as amici curiae. The trial judge also allowed both organisations to submit
information for the record.
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